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VII WALTON H. WALKER'S PUSAN PERIMETER DEFENSE
Successful senior leadership in the Army is strengthened based on the quality of professional relationships and role models provided between senior and junior officers. Senior leaders were developed by their experiences, and they must set the example for those who follow. The power of those ties is often challenged today by rapid pace and constant rotation of assignments. Additionally, the cultural ethic in the U.S. military of rugged individualism and personal responsibility, "make it on your own canteen," works to deny the personal relationships upon which close professional associations are based. Despite all the emphasis on the subject today, there are few professional mentors. Further, for those who need to know how to exercise effective leadership in the crucible of combat, there are few on active duty today with extensive experience. We must look to an earlier era. This paper will explore one example of the effects of modeled leadership on the professional development of an important U.S. strategic leader: has it ever been fully recognized in historical circles. Instead, Walker made use of the mobility of American forces and the interior road and rail lines that caused him to choose the Perimeter in the first place. He would employ forces along the major routes of advance into the perimeter, rely on air and artillery firepower, and reposition reserves where the line was threatened. Walker's mastery of the mobile defense lay not only in his employment of an appropriate defensive concept, but also most importantly in his impeccable timing. On multiple occasions, the Pusan Perimeter was simultaneously threatened along several different approaches, and General Walker sent his scant reserves to just the right place at the right time. An incredible sense of operational timing set Walker apart.4
What makes Walton Walker's achievements in the successful Pusan Perimeter defense even more remarkable is that they came at a time when United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces had experienced an almost unbroken string of losses against the North Koreans.
Walker defended with forces that were untrained, unready, already exhausted from a month of combat, with poor division and regimental leadership. He received less battalions than he had originally believed he would have to defend with, and had no choice but to feed those battalions one at a time against the onslaught of the North Koreans wherever they were needed most.
Additionally, General Walker was faced with the dilemma of anchoring his northern mountainous flank with coalition forces that he had come to distrust as unreliable as well. In several cases and since the XX Corps history had just then recently been published in Japan, the most plausible explanation of this document is that it was probably a version of Army or Corps lessons learned in combat29 The agreed fact is that there were references associated with
Patton that General Walker kept close at hand during the battles in Korea.
In sum, the specifics of how Walker emulated Patton during the Korean War are short. WORD COUNT=8503 and visible mentoring relationship between Patton and Walker. BG (Ret) Edward M. Lynch did see similarities of action and philosophy reflected between the generals, noting the similarity when he read D'Este's book on Patton, A Genius for War. This paper will attempt to further explore what those similarities were. The premise on which such exploration is based is that the combat association between Walker and Patton, senior leader to subordinate, must have had some impact, as such life-changing experiences often do. It has become accepted principal with the author, based on many conversations with combat veterans during his Army career, that there is a special character of relationship between men born of combat, as there is often between human individuals who share a challenge or trial. Additionally, the command climate established by General Patton in the Third Army, and its impact on operations, staff actions and the conduct of battle for subordinates like Walker, had a necessarily formative effect on Walker as a commander himself.
62 Tyner noted that General Walker visited the medical evacuation trains during the Pusan Perimeter defense. Lynch noted that Walker often talked to the surgeons at the Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals (MASH). Lynch tells a compelling story linking General Patton, Walker, and the wounded. In North Africa, General Patton was aided by the actions of Colonel H. William Wilbur, who earned the Medal of Honor. During the Pusan Perimeter defense, one day after the morning briefing, pilot Lynch was informed that Army Commander Walker was personally aiding the evacuation of a wounded officer. Walker accompanied the wounded and usually dissolves within months of the learning experience. Though our systems of professional education and training have continually improved, the pace and rotation of staff experience would make it a challenge for staffs of today to equal the common mindset and refined methodology of those who emerged from months of combat together in World War II.
